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Abstract—Islamism is a very debated topic in the West but 
almost exclusively explored in its violent forms. Nevertheless, a 
number of “vocal radical Islamist” groups exist in the West and 
legally operate because of their non-violent nature. Vocal radicals 
continually inspire individuals and lead them towards specific goals 
and priorities, sometimes even towards violence. This paper uses the 
long-living group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) to explore the elements that 
make the organization appealing to segments of Muslim community 
in the West. This paper uses three agency variables - reflexive 
monitoring, the rationalization of action and the motivations for 
actions – to analyze HT’s appeal vis-à-vis two other Islamist groups, 
Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), having similar goals 
and the same high international profile. This paper concludes that 
HT’s uniqueness is given by its method, detailed vision of the 
caliphate, consistency over time and the emphasis placed on the 
caliphate as the leading force of HT’s unchanged motivation for 
action. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
SLAMISM in the West has been a matter of concern for 
many years.1 While a great portion of the literature remains 
exclusively focused on Jihadi/Salafi groups such as ISIS or Al 
Qaida [10], [12], [30], [32], [34], [36], [38], only a few 
scholars turned their attention to “radical vocal Islamist 
groups” [20], [45], [46], [52], [56]. The term “vocal radical” is 
here associated with all forms of Islamist activism presenting a 
strong anti-Western and anti-integration stance but never using 
violent methods. These groups – often neglected by the 
literature – represent the choice of all those Muslims who 
might share the ultimate goals of Al Qaida, ISIS, or other 
violent groups but who do not accept the killing of innocent 
people.  
A long-living example of a radical vocal group is HT (the 
“Liberation Party”), which is founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by 
the Islamic scholar Taquiddin An-Nabhani. HT ideological 
tenets continue to shape various facades of Islamist 
contemporary activism, including mere intellectual groups and 
violent ones, such as al Muhajiroun [37]. Present in more than 
45 countries around the world and defined as an “Islam 
ideological vanguard” [20], HT continues attracting members 
of Muslim communities in the West. 
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1 There is a significant difference between “Islamist” and “Islamic”: while 
the former is an ideology (“Islamism”) defining the actions and conduct of 
Islamist groups, “Islamic” is an adjective referred to all Muslims and their 
faith, i.e. Islam [9].  
Using a comparative approach – analyzing HT vis-à-vis 
Ikhwan al-Muslimun and JeI – this paper aims to identify the 
elements that make HT appealing in the West and to clarify 
why these features are considered “unique” by HT affiliates 
(Hizbis) vis-à-vis other similar organizations. To do so, this 
article uses three agency variables identified by Giddens: 
reflexive monitoring, the rationalisation of action, and the 
motivations for actions [16]. While reflexive monitoring is 
used to reveal the similarities among the three groups under 
analysis, rationalisation of action and the motivations for 
actions are used to uncover HT’s unique features to account 
for the group’s appeal to segments of Muslim communities in 
the West.  
This paper uses original first hand data drawn from the 
author’s fieldwork in London (October 2015 - January 2016) 
and in Sydney (February-May a016) where the author 
conducted 16 interviews, four focus groups and observation 
with HT members.2 The remainder of this paper is structured 
as follows. First, it discusses HT’s agency and the three 
theoretical variables used for this study. Then, each variable is 
applied to the case study leading to relevant findings on HT’s 
appeal. Finally, in the conclusion, the author stresses the 
importance of the findings and the main contributions of the 
present work. 
II. HT AS AN AGENT 
As an ensemble of individuals, HT acts as a collective agent 
with a precise ideology and towards a well-defined goal, e.g. 
the re-establishment of the caliphate [39]. HT’s agency - 
intended as the power of agents “to think for themselves and 
act in ways that shape their experiences and life trajectories” 
[11], [14] – is impacted by a number of external stimuli. These 
stimuli work both as constraints and opportunities and fall 
under the umbrella term “structure”. The latter is intended as 
the ensemble of rules, conventions, institutions, procedures, 
and resources that the agent is subject to, which are able to 
limit but also empower the agent’s actions [16]. 
When considering HT’s agency within a specific national 
context, it is not only impacted by national authorities and 
their regulations, but also by other similar agents, who act as 
competitors. In order to identify HT’s features that make the 
group more appealing than its competitors to segments of 
Muslim community in the West, this paper uses three agency 
variables: reflexive monitoring, the rationalization of action, 
 
2 To respect interviewees’ privacy, pseudonyms were used instead of real 
names. The only exceptions were Uthman Badar, Wassim Doureihi, Ibthial 
Bsis, Nazreen Nawaz, and Taji Mustafa, who are official spokespersons and 
prominent members of HT Australia and Britain. 
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and the motivations for actions. Reflexive monitoring is 
understood as “a chronic feature of everyday action and 
involves the conduct not just of the individual but also of 
others” [16]. 
Agents do not only monitor and observe their own 
behaviors, but they are also impacted by the conduct of other 
agents and by the specific temporal and spatial settings in 
which they perform their activities. Therefore, agents’ actions 
and behaviors are exposed to both the influence of their peers 
and to the influence of the specific environment in which the 
actions take place. Agents exposed to similar environmental 
conditions and interacting with similar actors can develop 
common patterns of behaviors.  
Reflexive monitoring is useful for the present study because 
it gives greater insight into the emotional and environmental 
factors that gave rise to HT, Ikhwan, and JeI as international 
protagonists of contemporary Islamist activism. By using 
reflexive monitoring, this paper identifies the common ground 
of HT and its two competitors, which is a result of exposure to 
similar inputs, and analyses the two main concepts common to 
Islamic revivalist groups: their vision of the West and their 
ideal target group for recruitment. 
The second variable used in this paper to analyze HT’s 
uniqueness vis-à-vis its competitors is the rationalization of 
action. This concept is defined as a process where “agents 
maintain a continuing ‘theoretical understanding’ of the 
grounds of their activity” [16]. Agents are able to provide 
explanations for their conduct because they are driven by a 
certain degree of intentionality. Ira Cohen defined 
intentionality as the agents’ “knowledge or belief that specific 
kinds of practices will have a particular quality or outcome 
and the agents’ use of this knowledge to achieve the quality or 
outcome involved” [13]. 
Agents have a specific goal in mind, which is intentionally 
pursued with the knowledge and means available. While the 
reflexive monitoring is used in this paper to illustrate the 
common ground between HT and its competitors, 
rationalization of action is used as a theoretical tool to 
articulate the discourse on HT’s uniqueness. All agents have a 
certain degree of intentionality in performing their actions; 
data collected for this study reveal how HT’s rationalizations 
of its actions have differentiated it from Ikhwan and JeI and 
show how HT’s high level of intentionality constitutes the 
essence of the organization’s “competitive advantage” over 
the other two groups [35]. HT’s intentionality is very evident 
in three fields, which also constitute the main attractive 
elements of the organization for new recruits: its method, 
constitution for the caliphate, and rigidity over time. 
Motivations for actions represent the third agency variable 
used in this paper to compare HT with its competitors. 
Motivations “supply overall plans and programs within which 
a range of conduct is enacted” [16]. Motivations are related 
more to the potential for action than to the ways in which 
action is performed by the agent. Therefore, strong 
motivations will certainly determine powerful actions even 
when confronted with several potential obstacles. HT has 
relentlessly advocated to re-establish the caliphate in spite of 
decades of persecutions, bans, and arrests of its members, 
illustrating the strong motivation behind HT’s actions [23]. 
Using this third agency variable, this paper shows how HT’s 
strong motivations and persistence have served to increase its 
appeal to new recruits over the years.  
III. REFLEXIVE MONITORING: EXPLORING THE COMMON 
GROUND BETWEEN HT AND ITS COMPETITORS 
When agents are exposed to similar stimuli, they often 
develop similar behaviors; therefore, the fact that the founders 
of HT, Ikhwan and JeI were living in similar environments 
explains several of the similarities between the three groups.  
It was a period of political instability in Muslim regions, 
generated by the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 
creation of the state of Israel, and by the Western occupation 
of those territories, which had a significant political, 
economic, and social impact for those Muslim populations [7], 
[48]. 
HT, Ikhwan, and JeI represent the oldest and most 
widespread Islamic revivalist groups still active today. The 
three founders were contemporary brilliant minds, highly 
educated in both Islamic Law, the Western political system, 
and Western philosophy who wanted to hold on to Islam as the 
only powerful weapon for countering Western territorial and 
ideological colonialism. Ikhwan is, in a sense, the forefather of 
both HT and JeI, since it was founded first by Hasan Al-Banna 
in Egypt in 1928. After Ikhwan, Abul Ala Mawdudi founded 
JeI in British India in 1941, and 12 years later An-Nabhani 
founded HT in Palestine.  
As agents who wanted to make a difference in the particular 
period in which they were living, the three founders organized 
their actions by establishing groups that went back to the true 
teachings of Islam to cleanse society from all kinds of kuffar 
(unbelievers) influence by applying shari’a [18]. Not only was 
their groups’ agency carried out through intellectual activities, 
such as lectures, sermons at the mosque, study-circles, and 
leaflet campaigns, but all three groups were also engaged in a 
process of reflexive monitoring, where interaction with other 
actors fostered the adoption of similar ideas and behaviors.  
The single group focused on its own conduct first and then 
on the conduct of others, while also observing the 
environment in which the conduct is performed, making it an 
intergroup reflexive process. It is reflexive because each group 
first monitors and observes its own behavior, and it is an 
intergroup process because each group also observes the 
conduct and performance of its peers. Reflexive monitoring is 
the reason why the three groups share many of the same 
characteristics, which is a result of the fact that intellectuals 
from the three groups were familiar with each other’s ideas.  
The literature suggests that both An-Nabhani and Mawdudi 
were deeply inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, one of 
the most important members of Ikhwan [7], [15], [18]. He was 
an Egyptian intellectual and school teacher, who wrote 
Milestones during his 10-year-long imprisonment under 
Nasser’s rule. Milestones was first published in 1964 as a 
manifesto of contemporary Islamism, which has inspired 
several Islamic revivalist groups, both violent and non-violent 
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[47], [51].  
Undoubtedly, Qutb played an essential role in shaping the 
nature of Ikhwan in Egypt, and he also had a significant 
impact on all the groups that followed, including JeI and HT. 
Moreover, the three groups under analysis had both physical 
and intellectual contact with one another, while the debate on 
whether An-Nabhani was ever a member of Ikhwan is still 
open, it is certain that he had interactions with members of 
Ikhwan delegations who travelled to Haifa in Palestine [19]. 
Mawdudi’s contact with Ikhwan was purely intellectual and 
was initiated by one of his disciples, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi. 
He met with Sayyid Qutb and translated Qutb’s writings for 
Mawdudi and also translated Mawdudi’s writings into Arabic 
for Qutb [18], [50]. Contacts between the groups - and the 
consequential reflexive monitoring - led to common ideas, 
such as the critique of the West and specific target groups for 
recruitment. 
A. Western Enmity against the Muslims 
Besides the similar beginning, a crucial common point 
between the three groups is the holistic negative vision of the 
West as a system. HT, Ikhwan and JeI all hold that the 
Western system represents a danger to Muslims, since it aims 
to use both militarily and ideological force to annihilate Islam. 
The three groups urge the ummah to go back to the 
fundamentals of Islam, not as a religion but as a din (a way of 
life), and to present strong anti-colonial arguments that often 
overlap or complement anti-imperialistic and anti-American 
[22], [28], [45]. 
According to three groups, the most dangerous anti-Islamic 
Western ideas are democracy, secular laws, and capitalism, 
which are regarded as serious threats to the population under 
their rule: 
“Celebrities that have committed suicide include 
legends in their industry like Kurt Cobain, Robin 
Williams and Marilyn Monroe…celebrities that have 
suffered severe bouts of depression include Brad Pitt, 
Eminem, Nicki Minaj, Lady Gaga, Miley Cyrus and the 
list continues. The reality is that the capitalist system has 
not been able to provide happiness to people who are 
deemed as having everything which is material...money 
has not bought happiness to people who have immense 
wealth in monetary terms…the Western celebrity 
approach of “sex, money and drugs” has produced 
depressed, suicidal and unhappy individuals, it has 
brought misery to their lives, whilst ironically thousands 
look to them as the pinnacle of success…happiness has 
not been found at the bottom of a wine bottle and 
overflowing bank accounts…emptiness has overwhelmed 
them, because there is a vital aspect in their lives which 
is missing—their actual purpose in life” [25]. 
As highlighted by this recent HT Britain post, the 
organization sees the capitalistic ideology in Western 
democracies as producing an unhealthy environment, creating 
unhappy people who build their life on concepts that lead 
them to depression, anxiety, and misery. Both Ikhwan and JeI 
agree with HT on the excessive materialism in the West at the 
expense of the spiritual dimension. Materialism is regarded as 
sinful also by members of the Ikhwan, following the teaching 
of their founder Al-Banna: 
“The Europeans worked assiduously in trying to 
immerse (the world) in materialism, with their corrupting 
traits and murderous germs, to overwhelm those Muslim 
lands that their hands stretched out to…you are a new 
spirit making its way into the heart of this nation—
reviving it with the Qur'an; a new light dawning, 
dispelling the darkness of materialism through the 
knowledge of Allah [3]. 
In his message Between Yesterday and Today, Al-Banna 
exposes the effects of colonization in the Muslim world, 
defining the European-imported concept of materialism as a 
“tyranny on Muslim lands” [3]. According to Al-Banna (and 
An-Nabhani), the most dangerous kind of tyranny is the 
ideological kind established by colonial powers by introducing 
their haram (forbidden) practices into the Dar al-Islam (the 
Muslim world). Among these haram practices, Al-Banna 
includes the display of semi-naked women, drinking alcoholic 
beverages, the presence of theatres and dance halls, and the 
multitude of Western “silly games and vices” [3], [41]. 
Al-Banna created Ikhwan to be a group of sanctified 
individuals capable of leading their nation (Egypt) out of the 
darkness of materialism and Western influence to an Islamic 
revival based on a deeper knowledge of Allah [2]. Mawdudi’s 
view was also in line with An-Nabhani and Al-Banna’s ideas 
concerning materialism and Western cultural subjugation of 
Muslims in their home countries: 
 “This new civilization reached the height of its 
materialism and unfaith, where most of the Muslim 
nations are subjugated by the West…Muslims were 
invaded by the Western pen and the sword 
simultaneously… the minds that had already succumbed 
to the political dominance of the West quite easily also 
became impressed by Western knowledge” [49]. 
As illustrated by this quote, Mawdudi was also concerned 
about the spread of Western lifestyle, culture, and knowledge 
in Muslim majority countries where he thought Islam might be 
neglected in favor of new kuffar and haram practices. Having 
experienced British invasion in India, Mawdudi thought - like 
An-Nabhani and Al-Banna - that the only way to resist a slow 
but pervasive kuffar contamination was to establish a group to 
lead a revival of Islam and instruct people on their religious 
obligations and Islamic tenets. 
Ikhwan, HT, and JeI all share the same conviction that only 
shari’a is capable of assuring a good life, as it works as an 
intellectual (not coercive) regulating force for all realms of life 
[49], [53], [57]. These realms include the personal sphere 
(where the government is supportive of citizens, ensuring the 
population’s basic needs and the protection of disadvantaged 
social categories), and the international sphere (where a nation 
grounded on Islamic law should serve as an example of 
conduct for others, advancing international cooperation and 
working for the common good). Given the several advantages 
of a system based on shari’a, Ikhwan, HT, and JeI are 
confident in presenting the caliphate as the only system that 
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can holistically improve life for mankind [57]. At the same 
time, the three groups see Western former colonial powers as 
the main obstacle to its re-establishment. Al-Banna and 
Mawdudi were both severely critical of colonialism and its 
impact on Muslim identity and shared An-Nabhani’s belief in 
a Western hidden agenda to annihilate Muslims: 
 “The aim of colonialism was to create a generation of 
Muslims enslaved by Western culture and advocates of 
the Western system to further their colonial objectives in 
the region…Muslim puppet rulers continued to 
implement secular reforms, fostering the continuous 
process of decay and restricting the teaching of 
Islam…the result of this actions was a disastrous impact 
on Muslims' identity especially on youths. This hidden 
agenda has intensified in the last few years pursued under 
the umbrella of the war on terror and prevention of 
extremism…in addition, decades of poor organization, 
ineffective teaching methods, under investments due to 
fraud capitalistic systems and visionless regimes 
compounded the education crisis” [57].  
The alleged Western hidden agenda to destroy Muslims is a 
common theme of HT publications, events, and speeches even 
today. As illustrated by the above quote from the women’s 
section of HT, the group believes Western former colonial 
powers are determined to maintain their hegemony of 
Muslims by using soft power, such as the use of “puppet 
rulers”, the restriction of Islamic teachings, and the numerous 
measures that have taken place under the banner of the War on 
Terror. HT, the Ikhwan, and JeI maintain that Western 
colonial powers have “enslaved” Muslims not only through 
military, cultural, and political means, but also through an 
education crisis, which is held up as another core cause of 
decay fostered by Western colonizers [31], [57]. 
Given the numerous ideological similarities among these 
three groups, it appears that the reflexive monitoring process 
that HT, Ikhwan, and JeI are continually engaged with as 
collective agents have impacted the activities of the groups, 
creating similar patterns of behavior as a result of their similar 
worldviews.  
B. The Target Group for Recruitment 
The need to make the ummah familiar with the “authentic 
Islamic principles”, and not a blurred Westernized version, has 
pushed Ikhwan, HT, and JeI to perform the role of “educators 
of the masses” in the Muslim community. With this goal in 
mind, all three groups, in different areas of the world, have 
identified the same target group for recruiting their potential 
members: young Muslim intellectuals. This target group 
represents the second element resulting from the reflexive 
monitoring process of the three groups.  
Given the nature of their founders (Al Banna, Mawdudi, 
and An-Nabhani were all prominent intellectuals of their time) 
Ikhwan, JeI, and HT have always distinguished themselves by 
their ability to attract young Muslims, especially politically-
minded university students who are disenchanted with the 
democratic system and are looking for an alternative model to 
address their current problems, individually and collectively 
[20], [32], [33], [57]. 
Like HT, JeI, and Ikhwan are all very active in the 
academic world because of their desire to create a group of 
brilliant minds, educated on the group-sponsored tenets, who 
would then constitute the “vanguard party” challenging the 
Western social, political, and economic model [3], [6], [40]. 
With this aim in mind, the current leadership of the three 
groups encourages activists to constantly engage with society. 
While HT “knocks at society’s door” [52] with its 
publications, rallies, talks, lectures, public events and also 
through specific sister organizations that work with young 
adults, Ikhwan and JeI have built a solid network of 
infrastructures in the territories they operate.3 These 
infrastructures mostly concern schools, colleges, dispensaries, 
and hospitals and provide services to the population that the 
central government would normally offer [7], [15], [54]. By 
focusing on a variety of community support activities, all three 
groups aim to convince their audience of the benefits of re-
establishing the caliphate by comparing the glorious time of 
the Khilafah al-Rashida with the current troubled status of the 
Middle East.4  
By contrasting the glory of the Khilafah al-Rashida with the 
current troubled status of the Middle East and the decadence 
of the West, HT, Ikhwan, and the JeI all look for young 
intellectual minds from which a revolution of thought might 
originate, since these minds are best placed to educate 
Muslims on their religious obligations and present the 
caliphate as the only government that can “prevent anarchy 
and chaos” in the Muslim world [7]. 
IV. RATIONALIZATION OF ACTION: THE INTENTIONALITY OF 
HT AS AN AGENT  
While reflexive monitoring was used to explore the 
similarities between HT, Ikhwan, and JeI, this section uses 
rationalization of action—previously defined as an agent’s 
awareness that specific actions will lead to specific outcomes 
[13]—to point out HT’s intentionality as a distinguishing 
feature of the group vis-à-vis similar groups. HT’s strong 
intentions – over time and places - produced to a system of 
never-changing elements very much appreciated by its 
associates. In particular, the interviews conducted with current 
HT members identified three elements: HT’s precise method, 
detailed vision of the caliphate, and high degree of consistency 
over time.  
A. A “Rational, Clear, and Effective Method” 
In his interview with the author, Mohammad, a HT member 
for 15 years, described the group’s method using three simple 
adjectives: “rational, clear, and effective” [67]. Mohammed 
revealed how HT’s method was the main driver in attracting 
him to HT when he was a university student in Islamic studies, 
an experience that was common among other interviewees, 
who all identified HT’s method as one of the elements that 
first attracted them to the group. Mohammad’s idea on the 
 
3 An example is HT’s sister organisation Ansar-Sisters for Revival [5]. 
4 Al-Khilafah al-rashida refers to unified Islamic state “rightly guided by 
the four successors of the Prophet between 632-661” [19]. 
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method of HT was also shared by Nuha, senior member of HT 
Australia: 
“No other group has such a rational, clear, and 
effective method as the Hizb, for whom the caliphate is 
not mere utopia, but it is the main goal activists work for 
everyday following a detailed method” [58]. 
Undoubtedly, both Mohammad and Nuha were impressed 
by the work of HT activists to re-establish the caliphate, and 
especially the precise method employed to achieve this goal. 
HT’s current method is the same as the one proposed by the 
founder An-Nabhani in his seminal book Islamic State (1998), 
still read as part of the training and education of HT members 
today. HT’s founder envisaged five phases for the re-
establishment of the caliphate: the starting point (a small 
group of Muslims intellectuals, educated on HT’s main tenets, 
is constituted as the first nucleus of the group), the phase of 
indoctrination (the nucleus carries HT’s message and ideology 
outside the in-group to recruit new members), the take off 
point (HT becomes as a recognized collective presence among 
population), the phase of interaction (HT is ready to start 
controlling the society replacing Western-sponsored ideas 
with the Hizb-sponsored ones), and the phase of government, 
which marks HT’s ascent to power [4]. 
As pointed out by Uthman Badar – one of the leaders of HT 
Australia – in his interview with the author, HT’s ascent to 
power through a coup d’état concerns the Muslim world 
(specific areas called majaal) and not the West. As alarming 
as the word “coup” might sound, Badar defined HT’s coup as 
“consensual and not-bloody” since it would be preceded by 
the five phases. Maintaining a bottom-up approach - from a 
small nucleus, to the larger society, and eventually to powerful 
elites – once the ruling class agrees with the need of living 
under the caliphate as their Islamic obligation, Badar said that 
“they will then be ready to pass the power on to HT who will 
then initiate the coup” [59]. 
Thus, the educational preparation of the population will 
prevent any significant objections resulting in civil strife, 
given that both the society and the rulers will acknowledge the 
role of HT as the “legitimate actor” leading the change. The 
process described by Badar is what HT endeavors to create in 
all Muslim countries where it operates, even though the group 
is proscribed in all of them except Lebanon and the UAE. 
B. Differences with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and JeI 
HT’s method also stands as an important recruitment tool 
for the organization. While HT promotes a bottom-up 
approach that begins with a revolution of thought followed by 
a non-bloody coup to re-establish the caliphate, Mawdudi 
believed that an Islamic revolution should initiate a process of 
societal reform within the governance of an Islamic state. 
Hence, Mawdudi’s method is essentially a top-down approach, 
which emphasizes political struggle rather than working on 
individuals to first “make them perfect Muslims” [7] and then 
to change society and eventually the entire political system. In 
Mawdudi’s view, social change happens when political power 
is seized, which allows the implementation of large reforms. 
Furthermore, Mawdudi envisaged the rise of an Islamic 
governance within the structures of Western democracies, 
assuming that, with some significant adjustments, the Islamic 
state would emerge as a “theo-democracy” or a “democratic 
caliphate” [7], [8]. 
Such claims are absolutely haram for HT since the two 
terms (democracy and caliphate) are mutually exclusive. 
Given these premises and JeI’s rejection of violence, Mawdudi 
thought that engagement in politics was the main viable path 
towards re-establishment of the caliphate. For these reasons, 
JeI became a recognized and influential political party in 
Pakistan, capable of mobilizing the masses around specific 
issues. At the same time, the group exhibited contradictory 
behavior: while advocating for social justice and a pious 
Islamic ruler, Mawdudi himself became a senior statesman 
subject to man-made laws [44], [48].  
JeI’s method is considered by current HT members as too 
accommodating of kuffar politics. Though it strongly criticizes 
the state and the political establishment, JeI still accepts the 
political process as a viable path to an Islamic state. This 
mixed attitude accompanied by a top-down approach is what 
has pushed several individuals away from JeI and towards HT. 
This is the case of Farah, one of the most prominent female 
activists of HT Australia: 
“I have always been political minded since I was a 
teenager and—before joining the Hizb with my husband 
10 years ago—I was a member of the JeI in India. What 
drove me away from that group was the confusion among 
several concepts and stances, which all coexisted 
together…HT is very different: everything is clear and 
there is only one stance corresponding to the main 
plan…the individual is the center of HT’s actions 
because it is impossible to change a system from above 
in a long-lasting way without working on its constitutive 
elements to make the change stable…and the smallest 
units of a system are the individuals” [60]. 
Farah’s words stress the two core elements of HT’s method 
that made HT more attractive than JeI in her eyes: its 
immutable plan and the bottom-up approach. These two 
elements also form part of HT’s competitive advantage 
compared to Ikhwan. For individuals like Farah who long for 
the caliphate and a reliable actor to lead the Islamic revival in 
the contemporary world, the stability of HT in terms of 
method and main goals, made HT a more attractive option 
than Ikhwan.  
Over the years, Ikhwan has engaged with national 
governments, created parties, run for elections, and 
participated in a system which, according to HT, is nothing 
but corrupt [31]. On this subject, the words of Karyme’s (HT 
Australia) words are very strong: 
 “Ikhwan political participation in kuffar systems has 
marked the end of their role as a reform group advocating 
for Islamic revival…how can they talk about purity, 
about the need to go back to the sources of Islam and 
about reforms when they participate in a corrupted 
system, playing by corrupted rules and sitting in 
corrupted parliaments?” [61]. 
Karyme expressed disdain for groups like Ikhwan who 
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formally stand as Islamic revivalist groups but which also 
actively participate in a system that they consider corrupt. 
Again, Karyme’s interview points out HT’s rigid stances on 
many relevant themes such as political participation, which 
have remained unchanged and have served as a strength. HT 
members often point out the fact that, unlike Ikhwan, decades 
of repression have never altered HT’s method or plan. 
Conversely, under the umbrella of Ikhwan, there are many 
different groups ranging from political reformism to terrorism 
[15]. HT members dismiss Ikhwan and JeI for their 
involvement in allegedly corrupted systems, for changing their 
methods and goals, and for compromising with the West. 
C. A Detailed Vision of the Caliphate 
“Many groups advocate for the caliphate but they have 
no plan and no idea on what the caliphate should look 
like once established… not only HT has a plan but it also 
has a constitution ready” [62]. The words of Sadiqa, a 
senior member of HT Australia, illustrate another 
constitutive element of HT’s appeal over its peer groups, 
namely HT’s detailed vision of the caliphate. During the 
interviews, current members of HT stressed the high 
rationalization of action of their group based on HT’s 
thorough understanding of the future Islamic state, 
differentiating the caliphate from kuffar models. 
HT members often criticize both Ikhwan and JeI for not 
having a clear vision of the caliphate and for not producing 
specific literature on how an Islamic state should function. 
This is the case of Farah (HT Australia): 
“We can’t advocate for something we do not even 
have clear in our mind…what kind of caliphate do they 
[Ikhwan and JeI] want? It seems to me that what other 
Islamic revivalist groups advocate for is more of a 
blurred image drawn from Western parliamentary 
democracies” [63]. 
This “blurred image” linked to the Western system of 
government, mentioned by Farah in her interview with the 
author, is linked to some particular aspects of Ikhwan and JeI 
that deeply differentiate these two groups from HT. Ikhwan 
considers the re-establishment of the caliphate as a secondary 
element: the group has always been more concerned with the 
diffusion of Islamic morals within the society by providing 
education, healthcare, and other welfare services [7], [30], 
[54]. Ikhwan formally advocates for the Islamic state but also 
thinks that the Islamic state can take several forms, such as a 
parliamentary democracy, and see no contradiction between 
Islam and the “government of people”. Also, Mawdudi’s 
caliphate appears to include many Western elements. 
Although he did not write any draft constitution on the 
political apparatus of the future Islamic state, the founder of 
JeI borrowed Western concepts, such as the vision of the 
Imam as an elected president and the establishment of a 
parliament and an independent judiciary power [7]. 
Conversely, HT leadership attempted to map out all aspects 
regarding the future caliphate and its functioning, not only on 
a theoretical and conceptual level through the works of An-
Nabhani, but also by drafting a specific constitution for the 
Islamic state in 1979.  
HT’s constitution is important to HT members and is held 
up as evidence of the rationality and credibility of the 
organization compared to its competitors, especially Ikhwan 
and JeI. The first version of the “Proposed Constitution for an 
Islamic State” was issued right after the creation of the Party 
(in 1953), and an English version appears as an appendix in 
An-Nabhani’s book The Islamic State (1998). It is organized 
into the following 14 parts with specific provisions regulating 
all important aspect of life within the caliphate.5 The major 
role played by Islam is stated in the first part of the 
constitution (General Rules) in Article 1 and clearly states: 
“Islamic ‘Aqeedah [doctrine] is the foundation of the 
state’s constitution and laws. Therefore, nothing is 
permitted to exist in the State’s structure, system, 
accountability, or any other aspect connected with the 
State that does not take the Islamic ‘Aqeedah as its 
source” [4]. 
The opening is very clear: the foundation is Islam and only 
Islam, and every single aspect of the state should develop 
accordingly. This first article serves as a guarantee of a just 
system of government for HT members since “knowing Islam 
as the basis of the state is something that reassures us because 
our existence will not be regulated by man-made laws but by 
what God has established” [64]. 
The second part of HT’s constitution is specifically devoted 
to the Ruling System, where An-Nabhani introduces the 
concept of accountability. The document determines that all 
people occupying a position of power are responsible for all 
citizens equally and must not discriminate among groups. On 
this subject, HT’s constitution establishes that “non-Muslim 
citizens have the right to voice their complaints for any 
injustices or misapplications of the Islamic rules upon them by 
the rulers” [4]. Moreover, the multi-party system, articulated 
in Article 21 of the constitution, is something that HT 
members are very proud of because it distinguishes their 
Islamic state from the Islamic dictatorships characterizing 
many Muslim countries today [65]. 
The constitution then addresses elements concerning the 
social and economic system. The specific provisions of HT’s 
caliphate call for gender segregation and to preserve the role 
of women as “mothers and home makers”. Thus, the 
constitution guarantees the same rights for men and women 
but distinguishes different gender roles. HT allows caliphate 
women to “conduct all of life’s affairs” including participation 
in politics and working as public servants. The only limitation 
that imposed concerns are governmental positions, which 
women are barred from [4].  
While prohibiting seductive dress and make-up, HT’s 
constitution appears to be open minded in its conception of 
marriage as a set of mutual responsibilities between husband 
and wife, where the husband’s primary role is to take care of 
 
5 In details, the 14 parts are: General Rules, the Ruling System, the 
Khalifah, Deputy Assistant, Amir of Jihad, The Armed Forces, The Judiciary, 
The Governors of the Provinces, The Administrative System, Assembly of the 
Ummah, The Social System, The Economic System, Education Policy, and 
Foreign Policy [4].  
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rather than rule over his wife. The Marxist/Leninist influence 
on An-Nabhani’s thought is evident in the regulations of the 
economic system. In HT’s caliphate, all individuals are able to 
meet their basic needs, and the state has the primary role of 
distributing funds to citizens, ensuring an equitable 
distribution of resources [4]. For this reason, capitalistic 
companies and monopolies are absolutely forbidden, together 
with some other practices like usury, gambling, and 
squandering [4]. While allowing private ownership, the Hizbi 
caliphate advocates for a strong welfare state based on 
solidary, making it a quasi-communist economic system. For 
instance, HT’s constitution establishes that salaries will not be 
determined by the “knowledge or qualifications of the 
employee” but by the “value of his/her work or the benefit 
expected by the employee” [4]. 
The document also defines specific social responsibilities 
for the Islamic state, such as the public duty to give adequate 
support for those who have no funds and no job and to provide 
housing for the disabled [4]. Lastly, HT’s constitution also 
addresses education and foreign policy. HT’s rationalization 
for its actions, as having and pursuing a clear goal, is here 
highlighted by the provision of a state school curriculum, 
reminiscent of some authoritarian regimes, such as Italian 
Fascism, whose primary goal was to create a “Fascist 
personality”; similarly, the main aim of the HT’s caliphate is 
to create an “Islamic personality” [4]. For this reason, the 
constitution establishes that Islamic culture and Arabic are to 
be taught at all levels of education, and classes would be 
structured according to strict gender segregation [4]. The 
constitution also makes it clear that education should be 
provided freely, as an essential right for all citizens. This 
vision opposes what HT members often label as “the elitist 
Western view” that private education providers are better, 
since they are characterized by restricted access and high 
annual fees [4]. By establishing these regulations, HT aims to 
emerge as a “justice promoter” and an equal opportunity 
provider by promoting a model based on the “care of people, 
on their growth and development both individually and as a 
community” [66]. Furthermore, the fact that HT’s caliphate 
would have treaties and agreements with other states outside 
the Islamic state leads to two important conclusions: first, the 
aim of HT is not to subjugate the world under the power of 
Islam within a global caliphate, and secondly, HT’s Islamic 
state would maintain peaceful and collaborative relationships 
with other non-Muslim states. These two conclusions provide 
insights into the significant differences between HT’s 
caliphate and Al-Baghdadi’s one. The idea of a caliph and a 
caliphate apparatus caring for every individual is for many a 
very attractive aspect of HT. The fact that this intention is not 
tacit but written down in a constitution that makes HT even 
more credible and gives it a significant advantage over its 
competitors. 
D. The Organization’s Consistency over Time 
“Consistency is an essential element…a group cannot 
be considered reliable if it is not consistent overtime” 
[67]. Mohammad’s words introduce the third constitutive 
element of HT’s appeal over its competitors: the 
organization’s consistency. While many actors, such as 
national politicians or Muslims outside of HT, often 
criticize HT for its rigidity compared to other Islamist 
groups, which participate in the political process, HT’s 
rigidity was an appealing characteristic for all the 
members the author interviewed.  
“We are well aware of social, political, and economic 
changes of modern times but our aim and methodology 
do not change and never will” [66]. What Khalida 
stressed here perfectly epitomizes the position of HT 
members throughout the history of the organization: 
while being very politically minded and engaging in all 
the most pressing contemporary debates, HT members do 
not change their positions on salient themes, such as 
political participation or the re-establishment of the 
caliphate [24]. 
According to members, change their views on salient topics 
would mean “alter[ing] the nature and the very essence of HT” 
[58]. While this rigidity may be considered a disadvantage by 
some Muslims who see modernization as an essential 
requirement for the success and appeal of a group, members of 
HT represent that subgroup of people who look at structural 
rigidity as a great advantage for the organization’s 
effectiveness. In particular, this study looks at two HT-specific 
positions that the group has never changed: the use of violence 
and political participation. 
E. The Use of Violence 
With regard to the use of violence, HT has always presented 
itself as an “intellectual group”, rejecting violence and terror 
acts. Even more recently, after the ISIS terror attacks in 
Europe, senior HT members have emphasized that they do not 
support violent organizations, describing individuals 
perpetrating brutalities as unrepresentative of the Muslim 
world and their din. On this subject, Nazreen Nawaz - senior 
and prominent member of HT Britain – clearly depicts the 
terrorism of ISIS as not part of the ummah, but as a result of 
“misguided individuals and organizations”, who harm 
innocents: 
“I apologies that in the absence of the true Khilafah al-
rashida, many of your citizens have come to view the 
great din of Islam through the violent actions of a few 
misguided individuals and organizations… as a Muslim, 
this is what I will apologies for…I will not apologies for 
the actions of a few individuals or groups whose acts of 
violence against innocents does not represent my din or 
my ummah” [43]. 
Nawaz’s opinion is widely shared among HT Australia 
members interviewed by the author, who harshly condemned 
terror groups for disrespecting the “sacredness of life” and the 
role of God in deciding “who dies and who lives”, and many 
quoted the Qur’an 2:256: “there shall be no compulsion in 
[acceptance of] the religion”. Given these ideas, HT’s 
condemnation of terrorism has always been accompanied by a 
direct attack against Western governments, which are deemed 
responsible for the emergence of terror groups. HT members 
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have no hesitation in presenting terrorism as a natural outcome 
of centuries of Western occupation of Muslim lands and 
military, economic, and political subjugation of the ummah 
[68]. 
The unity of HT members as a shared intentionality, 
deriving from the same ideological sources as its 
rationalization for action, has prevented the organization from 
experiencing significant differences of opinion as well as the 
emergence of more extreme factions within the group. If 
somebody were to develop more violent inclinations, he or she 
would be immediately expelled from the organization.6 The 
same cannot be said for Ikhwan, who have split into several 
cells over the years and today is barely connected to the 
central Egyptian leadership [7]. The lack of centralization in 
the group has fostered several trends within Ikhwan, allowing 
the rise of cells that are very different from one another. The 
significant differences among the cells are mirrored by the 
different attitudes they have towards violence.  
Unlike HT, Ikhwan has always accepted the use of violent 
means to achieve political goals. For instance, in December 
1948, Ikhwan secret apparatus killed the Egyptian Prime 
Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi to counter the 
opposition by the government [48]. This event paved the way 
for several violent retaliations by both the group and the 
Egyptian national authorities, leading to the assassination of 
Al-Banna in 1949 and Qutb in 1966.7 Executed under 
President Nasser’s rule, Qutb strongly believed that violence 
and martyrdom were essential to for re-establishing the true 
Islamic state and that the da’wah alone was not enough [47].  
Qubt’s ideas have produced operative branches of the group 
that are considered terror organizations. A well-known 
example is Hamas, founded by Ikhwan in 1987 after the 
beginning of the First Intifada to fight Israel and its occupation 
of Palestine.8 Over the years, Hamas has perpetrated frequent 
suicide attacks against Israel, affecting the civilian population. 
At the same time, and in perfect harmony with Ikhwan’s 
attention to social programs, Hamas runs many support 
programs for the people of the Gaza Strip and has built 
hospitals, schools, and libraries throughout the area; as a 
result, Hamas has achieved widespread support among locals 
[17]. 
JeI is also a very heterogeneous group with multiple 
coexisting organizations operating under the umbrella family 
of JeI. For instance, in Pakistan, there are over a dozen 
 
6 This was the case with Omar Bakri Mohammed, a prominent member of 
HT Britain in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1996, Bakri began to think that 
HT was too moderate and soon came to despise the group’s attitude towards 
theological plurality and its non-violent attitudes regarding jihad. For these 
reasons, Bakri was expelled from HT Britain and founded Al-Muhajiroun, a 
group urging Muslims to use physical force to fight the West, by engaging in 
terrorist acts. 
7 Sayyid Qutb was one of the most prominent members of Ikhwan in 
Egypt, an international symbol of Islamic activism and resistance against 
foreign Western occupation of Muslim lands. His masterpiece, Milestones 
was first published in 1964. Milestones is a manifesto of Islamic activism 
written during Qutb’s 10-year imprisonment in Nasser’s Egypt, which 
culminated in Qutb’s execution by hanging in 1966. 
8 The First Intifada is the name given to the first Palestinian uprising 
against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The first uprising 
lasted from 1987 until 1991. 
organizations connected to the JeI, but only two of them are 
active through political channels. Four organizations are 
violent groups perpetrating violent acts and one represents a 
union of religious scholars [18]. This significant variety in just 
one country is a marker of the many trends existing within the 
same group.  
While it is fully involved in the political scene in 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, JeI has adopted strong pro-
Taliban attitudes, cultivating links with Al-Qaida and strongly 
opposing interventions in the global War on Terror. The 
different attitudes and positions of JeI branches even within 
the same country suggest a high degree of fragmentation and a 
low rationalization of action, given the different intentions of 
the branches and the individuals leading them. 
F. Political Participation 
Another unique aspect of HT is the group’s consistent 
stance on political participation. HT has always fought against 
the concept of the modern state, depicting it as a Western 
construction aimed at dividing Muslims and weakening the 
ummah [21], [26]. HT members have remained faithful to An-
Nabhani’s position on the illegitimacy of Westphalian states in 
the West and even more so in Muslim regions.  
In Muslim regions, HT members argue that all matters 
should be ruled by Islamic law (shari’a) with an Islamic 
system of government (khilafah). HT members do not 
recognize the Western division of the world into nation-states 
and still uses the Ottoman caliphate terminology to refer to 
geographical locations. For example, HT members use the 
term wilaya (province) to identify a territory, which can 
correspond to a nation or a region.9 The uncompromising 
refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the modern state also 
entails HT’s refusal to directly participate in the political 
process. HT prohibits its members from voting and running 
for elections. It also prohibits individuals form forming 
political parties in what is for them an “illegitimate kuffar 
system” [68]. 
While keeping up to date on the most pressing political 
issues by publishing daily news commentary and providing 
lectures and talks on the most relevant national and 
international matters, HT has not given in to the temptation to 
become a political party; however, both Ikhwan and JeI have 
become political forces in several countries and have 
participated in the Western system of the modern state, while 
advocating for the implementation of shari’a. As stated above, 
while occasionally pointing out the need for a caliphate to re-
establish order and peace in the Middle East, neither Ikhwan 
nor JeI shied away from playing a protagonist role in national 
politics. In fact, Ikhwan has not opposed the concept of nation 
states and has even declared itself in Egypt as a “popular 
national movement” [30]. Ikhwan has always struggled to be 
part of the political scene and to foster an Islamic revival in 
the countries they operate in through reforms. Towards the 
goal of reviving Islam in society and the state, Ikhwan 
members founded several, highly-supported political parties 
 
9 See the division of HT’s branches between “Muslim Lands” and the 
“West” on the official Central Media Office website [29]. 
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throughout the Middle East and the Muslim world.  
Some examples of Ikhwan-sponsored political parties 
include the Iraqi Islamist Party, Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(Iraq), Islamic Action Front (Jordan), Hadas (Kuwait), 
Movement of Society for Peace (Algeria), Justice and 
Construction Party (Libya), Justice and Development Party 
(Morocco), and Ennahda Movement (Tunisia). Al-Banna’s 
desire for political participation was also shared by the 
founder of JeI, Mawdudi, who supported the Indian National 
Congress Party, the first modern nationalistic movement in 
British India, established in 1885.  
Today, the JeI enjoys a high degree of support in India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and has engaged with 
the electoral process in these countries since the 1950s. In 
countries like Pakistan, JeI has become an influential national 
political party. It has formed alliances with other groups to 
reinforce its power such as the army, which due to JeI’s 
influence adopted an Islamic code of conduct [33]. 
V. HT’S MOTIVATIONS FOR ACTIONS 
A group’s motivations for actions are the third agency 
variable used in this paper to analyses HT’s uniqueness. While 
Ikhwan, JeI, and HT all aim to return to the “Golden Age of 
Islam” that will end the subjugation of Muslims and halt 
societal decline, their actions are differ significantly [55], [57]. 
As stressed in the previous sections, Ikhwan and JeI have 
changed their positions over time and have participated in the 
political process to Islamize society through reforms. 
Conversely, HT has not changed its action or motivations for 
action since 1953. Yet, the three Islamist groups share the 
conviction that the need to re-establish the caliphate is driven 
by two main reasons.  
First, the khilafah is the only way to fulfil a crucial religious 
obligation for Muslims, allowing them to live within a system 
based on shari’a. Ikhwan, JeI, and HT all consider shari’a the 
only law that allows men and women to live a good life and to 
prosper on earth, since it was divinely provided. Moreover, 
they all consider European colonial expansion in the Arab 
world to be the main cause for the fall of the caliphate. 
Secondly, the re-establishment of the caliphate is considered 
the only way to prevent the falling-off experienced by the 
ummah after kuffar influence and contamination.  
In Islamist discourses, the influence of Western colonizers 
in the Muslim world produced a gradual secularization of 
societies through the introduction of kuffar thoughts, which 
contradict Islamic principles, triggering the ummah’s stray 
from “God's true path (Sirat-ı Mustakim)” in favor of the 
progressive adoption of un-Islamic practices and values [7].  
All three groups have boldly spoken not only against 
Western colonial powers but also against Muslim rulers, who 
have been corrupted by the kuffar and have started leading 
their populations in a manner inconsistent with shari’a [55].  
In line with what the founders of the three groups believed 
decades ago, current members have been persuaded that the 
abandonment of Islamic principles has damaged the ummah 
globally: 
 “The ummah is like the human body: if one part is 
suffering, the whole body is in pain…and, when Islam is 
not correctly implemented, Muslims unavoidably suffer” 
[66]. 
This powerful comment was made by of one of the senior 
members of HT Australia in her interview with the author and 
is typical of the position of the three groups compared in this 
paper. The common thought among the groups is that the 
ummah is suffering because of the bad choices made by 
people in power who have neglected the divine law. 
Therefore, Ikhwan, JeI, and HT all have the main goal of re-
establishing the caliphate, which they see as urgent and 
absolutely necessary because of the discomfort the ummah is 
experiencing: 
The unified call for the khilafah was awe-inspiring, 
humbling and mesmerizing. From all around the world, 
from the rich to the poor, from the famous former 
Indonesian rock star Hari Mukti, to your everyday 
Muslim, there was only one thing on the minds of the 
people at the conference, and that was the khilafah [1].  
The demands of the “Arab Spring” in the last few 
years were a manifestation of the ummah’s resistance and 
perseverance. Their cries of “As-Sha’b yureed isqaat an-
Nizam”, “the people demand the fall of the regime!” 
were not only chanted in the streets and squares of the 
Arab world, but echoed throughout the Muslim world 
[27]. 
You can see the massive change in the Muslim world 
today, the Indonesia conference (100.000 attendees) is 
the perfect example of the largest conference supporting 
khilafah in history… also many recent studies and 
surveys—such as the one of the University of Maryland 
in the US (April 2007)—published a report that said that 
70% of people in the Muslim world would support a 
strict application of shariah and the unification of the 
Muslim states into one, i.e. the caliphate…this is 
something inevitable [42]. 
As stressed by these three extracts from HT official 
communiqués, textual posts, and videos, the organization is 
constantly engaged in producing visual and textual material to 
claim that the ummah throughout the world is longing for the 
caliphate and is deeply unhappy about the political, social, and 
economic status quo fostered by capitalism and Western 
powers. Nevertheless, while HT advocates daily for the 
caliphate, orienting all its actions towards this goal, Ikhwan 
and JeI have slowly adapted to the Western political context 
and campaign as a political party from within the system. 
While HT regularly organizes Khilafah Conferences around 
the world to familiarize Muslims with the glory of the 
caliphate, its two competitors appear to have moved the 
caliphate to the bottom of their political agenda and instead 
campaign for reforms and social justice within what HT 
members call a “kuffar system” [68]. Although there are 
common motivations for the actions of HT and its two 
competitors, the importance of their various motivations 
differs, and these differences determine different attitudes. 
More specifically HT has never changed its priorities, which is 
a direct result of its unchanging motivations for action. The 
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latter is rooted in the constant commitment of members to 
study of HT’s official adopted literature as soon as they join 
the group. 
New members are also required to pledge an oath, stating 
that they are ready to adopt everything that HT calls for, even 
if they are not fully convinced of the validity of HT’s 
arguments [56]. The need to always agree with HT leadership 
has assured the group a high level of consistency over time 
and engages members in daily activities able to provide them 
with a sense of security, deriving from being righteous before 
God, which significantly reduces their anxiety, shame, and 
guilt because they are persuaded that they are fulfilling God’s 
will. Therefore, HT motivations for actions are hard to change 
and they result appealing to those people looking for a stable 
and invariable advocate for Muslims.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The present paper examined the specific elements that make 
HT attractive for certain segments of Muslim communities in 
the West vis-à-vis its competitors. Through comparing the 
group with Ikhwan al-Muslimun and JeI, the present paper 
analyzed HT’s uniqueness by using three agency variables: 
reflexive monitoring, rationalization of action, and 
motivations for actions. While reflexive monitoring was useful 
for elucidating the common ground between Ikhwan, HT and 
JeI, rationalization of action and motivations for actions were 
used to identify the main differences among the three Islamic 
revivalist groups. 
The present analysis concluded that HT’s rigidity—best 
expressed by the group’s rationalization and motivation for 
actions—was the main element constituting HT’s competitive 
advantage over Ikhwan and JeI. More specifically, the group’s 
unchanging method (following the steps outlined by An-
Nabhani in the 1950s), its detailed vision of the caliphate 
(supported by a constitution), and HT’s stable premises for 
actions (with the caliphate as the group’s number one priority) 
conveyed an image of HT as a stable and reliable actor, 
advocating for a global Islamic revival. This HT-sponsored 
image is an attractive element for a number of Muslims in the 
West, who decide to join HT rather than JeI, Ikhwan or even 
other violent groups because of HT’s ability to stand as an 
ideal arena where members feel safe and fulfilled in their role 
as zealous Muslims. Furthermore, HT emerges as a stable 
group through which Muslims can oppose Western (cultural, 
social and political) domination, not through engaging in 
violent acts but through a war of ideas based on the view of 
the caliphate as a panacea for the hardship experienced by the 
ummah in the world.  
As stressed in this paper, HT advocates for the caliphate 
and has a draft constitution ready, which provides useful 
information on what kind of caliphate it envisages. Since this 
is the first study presenting an overview of HT’s constitution, 
this analysis was both useful and necessary for a deeper 
understanding of HT’s competitive advantage over Ikhwan 
and JeI. 
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